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American contract law is supposed to facilitate the efficiency and fairness of market transactions between parties. Does 
the increasing success of the puffery defense in false advertising and securities cases further the fairness of transactions 
between companies with major advertising budgets and consumers? This Article contends that it does not. 
 
In assessing the validity of a market transaction, American contract law assumes that transparency exists between the 
parties. But because of courts' willingness to accept the puffery defense, companies have significant ability to lessen the 
transparency. Puffing about products or services, such as claims that a product is the best in the world or America's fa-
vorite, leaves consumers in the dark about the true attributes and qualities of advertised products or services. When 
courts honor the puffing defense, they thereby leave consumers unprotected and lacking a remedy for harm suffered 
from reliance on the puffing. Paradoxically, the puffery defense succeeds when a company's boasts about its products or 
services cannot be proven true. 
 
This Article urges a reexamination of the assumptions underlying the puffery defense and the disparate treatment of 
dishonesty in the commercial and personal contexts. Such a reexamination is needed now more than ever, as courts may 
become increasingly willing to assume (mistakenly) that expanded access to information renders consumers savvy 
enough to disregard commercial puffery. 
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 LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY: 
 ... The final section places legal treatment of puffing into a more general context in which questionable assumptions 
underlying contract law provide the structural background responsible for the law of puffery.  ... In another matter, an 
advertisement that certain lamps were "far brighter than any lamp ever before offered for home movies" was deemed to 
be puffery, but when the advertiser quantified the alleged superiority of the product by stating "35,000 candle power and 
10-hour life," the court found a potential claim for false or misleading advertising.  ... The opinion in American Pasta 
suggests that plaintiffs, even when armed with consumer survey evidence showing consumers are reading exaggerated 
statements as actual fact, face an uphill battle in convincing courts that competitor's slogans are in fact verifiable claims 
subject to suit.  ... The opinion also demonstrates the fine parsing of words courts often engage in when deciding dis-
putes involving alleged puffery.  ... Any buyers or sellers at the time had strong incentive to uphold an honest trade for 
accountability and religious reasons.  ... Because the opportunity costs of shopping for information about products dif-
fers among buyers and consumers often fail to read or understand the terms in standard form contracts, the theoretical 
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ability of markets to optimize consumer utility is not realized in the absence of remediation in the institutional arrange-
ment of the market by the polity. 
 
HIGHLIGHT: [T]he gun that won the [W]est n1 
Better Ingredients. Better Pizza n2 
[B]est tires in the world n3 
America's Favorite Pasta n4 
 
 TEXT: 
 [*69]  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Catchy. Memorable. Clever. These words might come to mind if one were asked to describe the above slogans. The 
words fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading probably do not come to mind. But those are just the words competitors used 
when challenging these slogans as false and misleading advertisements. 
In response to allegations of false advertising, companies often do not stand by the truth of their claims. In other 
words, they do not try to prove that their tires are the best tires in the world or that their brand of pasta is America's fa-
vorite brand. Instead, they essentially concede that the statements are not true, or at least are not verifiable, and then 
argue for immunity from liability nonetheless because the statements constitute "mere puffing." n5 For centuries, courts 
have refused to impose liability for statements that, although possibly false, are so exaggerated or vague that,  [*70]  
allegedly, no reasonable consumer would take them literally. n6 Such statements are called puffery or puffing. In other 
words, courts have concluded that no reasonable consumer would believe that Papa John's Pizza had better ingredients 
and better pizza than all other competitors just because the company's slogan says as much. 
In effect, puffing is tolerated because the legal rules for telling the truth are different in commercial relations than in 
the ordinary commonsense meaning of a statement that one knows is not justified by the facts of the situation. A 
memorable scene from the film Sunshine Cleaning illustrates this point. A father, portrayed by Alan Arkin, paints a sign 
on the van advertising his daughter's new business; the sign says "In business since 1963." n7 The daughter demurs, "It's 
a lie." n8 The father says "No, it's a business lie. That's different from a life lie." n9 The daughter laughs in response. n10 
This toleration of the business lie is analogous to the court's general tolerance for puffing. 
The argument here is that puffery is an ambiguous legal doctrine that draws its sustenance from outdated assump-
tions about what is fair to expect from typical consumers in a modern market exchange. Section II traces the origin and 
evolution of puffing to establish the need to align legal principles to the historical setting in which they are being ap-
plied. Section III establishes the lack of clarity in the legal standards for identifying puffing. Section IV examines the 
varied treatments by courts to statements alleged to be puffery. The final section places legal treatment of puffing into a 
more general context in which questionable assumptions underlying contract law provide the structural background re-
sponsible for the law of puffery. 
II. Origin and Evolution of the Doctrine of Puffing 
To understand how litigants successfully invoke the puffery defense and how courts analyze disputes over alleged 
puffing, it is necessary to examine the origins of the defense. The term "puffing" was first used to  [*71]  describe the 
practice of illegally bidding up prices at an auction. n11 The person who was paid secretly by the seller to bid up the 
prices was called a puffer. n12 As early as the sixteenth century, the concept of puffing was invoked as a defense to fraud 
and misrepresentation allegations. n13 Courts found that claims of fraud or misrepresentation could not be based on 
opinions, statements of value, or immeasurable assertions. n14 For example, an English court provided no redress to a 
buyer who relied on the seller's assertion about the value of the purchased property, reasoning that it was the "plaintiff's 
folly to give credit to such an assertion." n15 
The court's chastising of the buyer for being so na ve as to believe the seller's claims aptly illustrates the assumption 
about consumer behavior on which the early concept of puffery was based. Courts assumed that buyers had an opportu-
nity for inspection before purchase. Although this assumption may seem far-fetched in the era of Amazon, it likely was 
legitimate in a time of simple transactions that generally occurred in face-to-face meetings. n16 As an English court in 
1534 noted in regard to the sale of a horse: "If he be tame and have been rydden upon, then caveat emptor," n17 which of 
course means: let the buyer beware.  Courts felt comfortable letting buyers mind their own fates because they assumed 
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buyers were interacting with sellers and the goods and would not be fooled by the seller's talking points. n18 With an op-
portunity for inspection, consumers did not have to accept a seller's assertions as truth. n19 Whether an inspection took 
place was a verifiable, factual inquiry undertaken by the court. 
Early American jurisprudence recognized puffery as a legitimate defense, but courts generally rejected the need to 
determine whether a buyer had the opportunity to inspect the goods. In 1853, the Supreme Judicial  [*72]  Court of 
Massachusetts observed that a plaintiff cannot base a misrepresentation claim on "statements made by sellers, concern-
ing the value of the thing sold" because it "[has] been understood, the world over, that such statements are to be dis-
trusted." n20 The court noted that in "other cases" courts have found a statement inactionable because "by ordinary vigi-
lance and attention, [the buyer could] have ascertained that the statement on which he acted was false," but the court did 
not require proof of an inspection before dismissing the buyer's claim. n21 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes somewhat famously confirmed this approach to puffery when he held that "the 
mere fact that the property is at a distance, and is not seen by the buyer does not change the rule that sellers' statements 
are not to be believed." n22 By doing away with the inspection requirement, American courts implicitly acknowledged 
changing business transactions and molded the puffery defense to survive these changes. 
Puffery gained a further foothold in American jurisprudence during the Strict Law era when courts leaned heavily 
on a caveat-emptor approach to commercial questions. n23 The puffery defense continued to hinge on assumptions about 
consumers being informed and savvy. Courts in the early 1900s observed that buyers and sellers had "equal means of 
knowing" about products n24 and that buyers rightly distrusted slogans and advertisements. n25 Judge Learned Hand ex-
pressed a rather dismal view of the veracity of statements made during commercial transactions, yet also showed confi-
dence in consumers' ability to assess these statements when he stated: 
There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes seriously, and if he does he suffers from his credulity. If 
we were all scrupulously honest, it would not be so; but, as it is, neither party usually believes what the seller says about 
his own opinions, and each knows it. n26 
III. The Lack of Clarity in the Boundaries of Puffery 
Although the complexity of market exchanges has changed dramatically since Holmes made his remark, the puffery 
defense continues  [*73]  to thrive in modern law. No standard legal definition of puffery has evolved, however. n27 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adheres to one of the detailed definitions, finding puffery as either "an 
exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified in relying" or "a 
general claim of superiority over comparable products that is so vague that it can be understood as nothing more than a 
mere expression of opinion." n28 The Third Circuit more succinctly provides that puffery is advertising "that is not de-
ceptive, for no one would rely on its exaggerated claims." n29 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines puffery as 
"those [claims] that ordinary consumers do not take seriously." n30 Scholar W. Page Keeton offers a more colorful defi-
nition, stating that puffing is "a seller's privilege to lie his head off, so long as he says nothing specific." n31 
Although most definitions focus on statements that exaggerate or boast about a product in a positive light, n32 puff-
ery also takes shape as a negative assessment of a competitor's product. For instance, in an advertisement for a razor, 
Norelco claimed that any razor providing a closer shave than its product "Could Be Too Close for Comfort." n33 Gillette, 
Norelco's direct competitor, challenged the statement as misleading, but the court found Norelco simply was puffing 
about the possibility of another product not performing well. n34 
Although definitions of puffery vary in precision, n35 courts appear to agree that immeasurable, non-factual state-
ments will almost always qualify  [*74]  as puffery. n36 The Eighth Circuit explained that, "if [a] statement is not spe-
cific and measurable, and cannot be reasonably interpreted as providing a benchmark by which the veracity of the 
statement can be ascertained, the statement constitutes puffery." n37 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has observed that "[t]he 
common theme that seems to run through cases considering puffery in a variety of contexts is that consumer reliance 
will be induced by specific rather than general assertions." n38 
For example, a court found the claim that a disposable diaper "fit more naturally" than other diapers inactionable 
because the statement was incapable of verification. n39 The court reasoned that people cannot agree on what factors 
make a diaper comfortable, and the measurement of any possible factors is based on subjective consumer perception. n40 
In another matter, an advertisement that certain lamps were "far brighter than any lamp ever before offered for home 
movies" was deemed to be puffery, but when the advertiser quantified the alleged superiority of the product by stating 
"35,000 candle power and 10-hour life," the court found a potential claim for false or misleading advertising. n41 
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Thus the common denominator in statements that constitute puffing is the lack of verifiable content. This often puts 
companies in the awkward position of arguing that their slogans and descriptions of products essentially are untruthful. 
The case of Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble n42 illustrates well the precarious position in which a company wishing to 
claim immunity from suit because of puffery is placed. Clorox challenged two statements made by Proctor & Gamble 
(P&G) in regard to a laundry detergent that contained a non-chlorine whitening agent: "Whiter is not possible," and 
"Compare with your detergent . . . Whiter is not possible." n43 P&G initially asserted a puffery defense but ultimately 
admitted the latter statement was not puffery because the company had studies comparing its product with other deter-
gents and, indeed, its products produced whiter  [*75]  clothes. n44 This admission illustrates the often strange paradox 
puffery cases present. Companies are successful in asserting the puffery defense when their boasts cannot be proven, 
and thus, the truth is irrelevant. When their boasts are truthful, the companies must concede the statement is not puffery 
and therefore open themselves to protracted litigation debating the merits of their evidence. n45 
IV. Litigating False and Misleading Product Claims 
Litigation over allegations of false or misleading statements can become particularly protracted in cases alleging 
false or misleading advertising under the Lanham Act n46 or material falsehoods related to securities. n47 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act permits claims for a "false or misleading description of fact or false or misleading 
representation of fact" made "in connection with any goods or services." n48 This provision of the Lanham Act promotes 
the dissemination of accurate information about consumer products and services. n49 Plaintiffs, who are generally com-
petitors  [*76]  claiming damage from the allegedly false or misleading statements, n50 may assert either that a state-
ment is literally false or implicitly false, such as where the representation is misleading, even if literally true or am-
biguous. n51 In challenging the falsity of a statement, the defendant may raise the puffery defense. n52 Defendants typi-
cally must show that the statement is non- factual or incapable of being falsified to prevail on such a defense. n53 The 
rationale for relying on the distinction between statements of fact and unverifiable claims is that the consumer is 
unlikely to be deceived by an unverifiable claim. Whether a statement is capable of being verified is a question of law in 
false advertising cases. n54 
Courts' assessment of the factual nature of statements has created inconsistent application of the puffery doctrine. n55 
Courts have found seemingly factual statements to be puffery, including a claim that a videogame system was "The 
Most Advanced Home Gaming System in the Universe" n56 and a claim that a particular model gun was "the gun that 
won the west." n57 In the latter case, the competitor challenging the statement asserted that its model gun literally did win 
the West and presented evidence in support of this assertion. n58 Nonetheless, the court rejected the evidence, stating that 
"[w]hile any claim may have some basis in fact, the claim of exclusive responsibility [for winning the West] is inevita-
bly an exaggeration." n59 
  [*77]  
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in American Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co. n60 further illustrates the diffi-
culty of determining whether statements used in advertising are verifiable. New World Pasta Company challenged the 
use of the phrase "America's Favorite Pasta" to describe the Mueller's brand, which was distributed by American Italian 
Pasta Company. n61 To advance its claim, New World Pasta Company produced consumer surveys showing subjects 
interpreted the slogan "America's Favorite Pasta" to mean either that Mueller's is a national brand or the nation's number 
one selling pasta, neither of which was true. n62 American Italian Pasta Company argued that its slogan was "non- ac-
tionable puffery." n63 For New World Pasta Company's false advertising claim to go forward in the face of the asserted 
puffery defense, the court had to find that "America's Favorite Pasta" was a "specific and measurable claim, capable of 
being proved false or of being reasonably interpreted as a statement of objective fact." n64 
The court rejected the survey evidence as a means of determining whether the slogan was verifiable, fearing that 
such reliance would result in "unintended liability for a wholly unanticipated claim." n65 The court was unwilling to al-
low consumers' responses to a survey dictate the outcome of the claim, fearing it would lead to "unpredictability [and] 
could chill commercial speech." n66 Instead, the court relied on the dictionary definition of "favorite" as meaning "mark-
edly popular especially over an extended period of time." n67 The court then reasoned that, "By combining the term 'fa-
vorite' with 'America's,'" American Italian Pasta Company simply was asserting that Mueller's "has been well liked or 
admired over time by America." n68 This assertion, the court held, was neither specific nor measurable. n69 Conceding that 
the survey evidence suggested the slogan could be interpreted differently, the court stated that "the Lanham Act protects 
against misleading and false statements of fact, not misunderstood statements." n70 The opinion in American Pasta sug-
gests that plaintiffs, even  [*78]  when armed with consumer survey evidence showing consumers are reading exag-
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gerated statements as actual fact, face an uphill battle in convincing courts that competitor's slogans are in fact verifiable 
claims subject to suit. 
The opinion also demonstrates the fine parsing of words courts often engage in when deciding disputes involving 
alleged puffery. Other cases bolster the point that seemingly minor differences in the use of words may affect how an 
advertisement is characterized. For example in Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed a jury verdict that the description of a product as "the FIRST name in Shift Kits" was "merely puffery" even 
though the product was not the first one on the market. n71 The court did not question whether the claim was verifiable, 
but instead assumed that "FIRST" referred to the quality of the product, rather than entry into the marketplace. n72 In 
contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in ruling on a challenge to the slogan "1st Choice of Doctors," stated that, "In English, 
'first' is ordinal. . . . A runner who crosses the finish line ahead of all others is 'first.'" n73 One might think that such at-
tempts at canonical statements of meaning would perplex the courts in that they are definitive and definitively in con-
flict. 
Further illustrating that the context of the ad matters, a federal court found the statement "most weatherable" was 
actionable because it was included in a brochure featuring independent testing results of vinyl siding. n74 The court ex-
plained that, although the phrase, "standing alone, would likely be mere puffery . . . the Court must consider the entire 
context of the ad, not each sentence or word in isolation." n75 In the Clorox case, the court was torn over whether the 
slogan: "Whiter is not possible" was puffery. n76 The court observed that, "Standing alone, that statement might well 
constitute an unspecified boast, and hence puffing." n77 But in the context of the ad, consumers were invited to compare 
the detergent with other products, and in doing so, P&G rendered its slogan "a specific measurable claim." n78 
Just as false advertising claims cannot be based on statements that ordinary consumers would not believe, so too, in 
the federal securities  [*79]  context, do courts consider whether a reasonable investor would rely on the challenged 
statements. n79 Private plaintiffs or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can bring a fraud action for state-
ments companies make to shareholders that omit or misrepresent "material" facts. n80 A fact is "material" if there is "a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." n81 The ques-
tion of materiality is one of both fact and law in which courts aim to determine "the significance of the reasonable in-
vestor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information." n82 Companies may raise puffery as a defense by 
arguing the statement was merely a "vague statement[] of corporate optimism" that a reasonable investor would ignore. 
n83
 For example, the Second Circuit dismissed an IBM executive's claim that "we're not-despite your anxiety-concerned 
about being able to cover the dividend for quite a foreseeable time" as being "plainly an expression of optimism that is 
too indefinite to be actionable." n84 
A review of recent cases involving securities fraud suggests that "defendants have been increasingly successfully in 
obtaining dismissals based on puffery arguments." n85 The defense is most successful when the statement being chal-
lenged is one about the future, n86 such as claims that corporate earnings are "in line with analysts' current projections" 
and there is "an expected annual growth rate of 10% to 30% over the next several years." n87 Until 1979, the SEC did not 
even permit companies to issue forward-looking statements. n88 When the SEC did away with this prohibition, future- 
oriented statements became fodder for misrepresentation  [*80]  claims. n89 In the case of the statements just noted, the 
Fourth Circuit held that they were immaterial puffery, in part because "[n]o reasonable investor would rely on these 
statements." n90 Such projections were distinguished from "guarantees" that may be material to investors' decisions. n91 
Courts see a potential danger in imposing liability for future-looking statements because they "will almost always prove 
to be wrong in hindsight." n92 
When judges find a statement to be immaterial based on puffery, they appear to be assuming that "reasonable in-
vestors do not invest capital based on optimism but, instead, invest based on facts." n93 Yet, as with the false advertising 
cases, courts sometimes decline to hold companies accountable for statements lacking a factual basis. For instance, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the statement that a contract would "establish[] the company as a major participant in the Argen-
tine water market" was immaterial puffery, even though the defendant lacked the financial capacity to become a major 
participant. n94 The court reasoned that the defendant "was under no duty to cast its business in a pejorative, rather than a 
positive light." n95 Thus even though the statement appeared to be grounded in facts and hardly was an exaggerated, out-
landish claim, the court dismissed it as puffery. n96 
Despite the increasing success of the puffery defense over the past few decades, a recent securities case against the 
discredited mortgage giant Countrywide, suggests that courts may become more hostile to the defense. Investors in 
Countrywide brought a suit under federal securities law seeking damages for false and misleading statements about the 
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company's essential operations. n97 One of the statements challenged was the generic description of Countrywide's op-
erations as "high quality." n98 
The court acknowledged that a statement such as this is generally not actionable because it is "vague and subjective 
puffery." n99 But the court found the investors "adequately allege[d] that Countrywide's practices so departed from its 
public statements that even 'high quality' became materially false or misleading; and that to apply the puffery rule to 
such allegations would deny that 'high quality' has any meaning." n100 This ruling  [*81]  is rather remarkable given 
that, from the earliest days of the puffery defense, generic descriptions such as "high quality" were protected. n101 But the 
court appeared to be acknowledging that the statement was a verifiable claim and that the facts did not validate the as-
sertion. 
In addition, the Countrywide case suggests that, in making investment decisions, investors can reasonably rely on 
descriptions of a business as offering "high quality" service or products, rather than solely on hard facts and numbers. 
n102
 This suggestion aligns with behavioral research, which strongly indicates consumers rely on statements that courts 
would characterize as innocent puffing. n103 For example, in one study, subjects did not distinguish between the state-
ment that a car gets "27 miles per gallon on regular gas" and the more general boast that a car has "truly excellent gas 
mileage." n104 When asked whether Minute Rice's claim to make "[p]erfect rice every time" was true, 73% of participants 
said it was true either completely or partially. n105 Consumers also tend to believe factual claims, such as the "brand chil-
dren's doctors recommend the most" n106 at the same rate as more vague claims, such as "fast and gentle relief." n107 De-
spite research results to the contrary, however, when applying the puffery defense, courts envision the savvy, rational 
consumer who can see through any sales pitch and use the advances of the modern world to test claims and compare 
products. The law's response to these deceptive slogans and advertisements is to assume consumers are too smart to be 
misled. 
Some speculate that the proliferation of websites allowing consumer reviews of products and services "will likely 
change the importance of advertising in computer- age society." n108 There may be a growing perception that "[m]ost 
consumers today are highly media savvy and know how to deconstruct advertisements." n109 Courts already have recog-
nized that  [*82]  "[t]he relative expertise of the speaker and the listener can be a critical factor" in assessing a puffing 
defense. n110 If perceptions of consumers shift toward a belief that they are more sophisticated in today's market than ever 
before, courts may well be even more resistant to actions based on false claims. 
V. Assumptions of Contract Law as a Basis for Excessive Tolerance of the Puffery Defense 
In the broadest sense, contract law exists to facilitate an efficient, fair transaction n111 between two parties. n112 As this 
section examines the truth value of these assumptions, the pertinent question for purposes of our argument should be, 
"Does the puffery defense strengthen these objectives of contract law?" 
Although the relevant parties in any given contract may range from a firm to a spouse to a consumer, the con-
sumer-firm relationship is most germane to our discussion of puffery and the business lie. 
Three principal types of contracts are used to establish the terms of a transaction between a firm and a consumer: 
negotiated contracts, standard-form contracts, and implicit contracts. The use of form contracts has increased dramati-
cally over the past several decades, while jointly negotiated contractual agreements are becoming passe. n113 Negotiated  
[*83]  contracts are becoming obsolete n114 as firms find it less costly and more time-effective to produce one stan-
dard-form contract covering all necessary specifications of the transaction. Implicit contracts, or "invisible handshakes," 
n115
 as Arthur Okun once termed them, are essentially "tacit agreements that are not written down." n116 
Very little evidence is available to mark the existence of implicit contractual agreements because of the difficulty 
inherent in collecting data about implicitly established specifications. n117 In most instances of modern trade, consumers 
are not provided with an explicit contract to read, agree to, and sign. So what happens when the quality, price, and 
specifications of a product are not expressly enumerated on a printed piece of paper? Buyers are forced to rely on oral 
agreements and implicit contracts that are murky and establish dubious terms of trade. For the purpose of this Article, 
we center our attention on the standard-form contract and the implicit contract. Those contracts are the venue in which 
false product claims do major damage to commercial fairness. 
Several assumptions are relevant and necessary for discussions about contract law and the transparency n118 of the 
agreement to which a firm and a consumer arrive. n119 Contract law assumes that signing agents are rational n120  [*84]  
and that information is perfectly disseminated between parties. These assumptions play key roles in legitimizing the 
terms of trade between two parties. But, why do we fail to assess the seemingly unquestionable nature of these assump-
tions in common American institutions? The assumptions are so deeply ingrained in tradition and daily thought that we 
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must explore the historical roots of the rational agent and the power disparity between consumer and seller before taking 
steps to amend modern contract law. 
The rational agent and equal information assumptions inherent in consumer contract law are rooted in the fertile 
grounds of England's Industrial Revolution. n121 Before 1200, the Common Law of England regulated legal responsibility 
under strict liability. n122 When harm was caused, the injurer paid for it, regardless of whether harm was intended. The 
King's Treasury, as well as the victim of the injury, was compensated for the ill fortune. n123 As time passed, the injurer 
was not always forced to pay the King's Treasury-particularly if harm was caused accidentally. n124 However, the injurer 
continued to be obligated to compensate the injured  [*85]  party. At the same time of the advent of tort law, private 
negotiations began to spew over into the realm of the court system. n125 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, most people produced what they needed on a subsistence basis. n126 Thus, few 
consumers existed. Moreover, the limited participation in commerce was done on a local level. n127 Any buyers or sellers 
at the time had strong incentive to uphold an honest trade for accountability and religious reasons. n128 
As a result of the invention of the steam engine and more efficient modes of transportation during the Industrial 
Revolution, products were more frequently purchased from distant locations. Buyers could not inspect the products they 
intended to purchase. n129 Consumers became isolated from the seller-or the corporation, of which the United States 
would begin to see an influx in the 1800s. n130 Consequently, a seller no longer needed or maintained a "kinship" with the 
buyers of his product. Quality and honesty have always been important lubricants to commercial behavior, but distance 
creates a diminishing focus on those product attributes that the consumer can impose. 
In the late 1700s, legal thought increasingly moved in the direction of a marketplace where individuals could and 
should establish their own terms of trade through contracts. Capitalism prompted visions of individual responsibility 
and a laissez-faire approach to trade and market transactions. n131 
The classical school of economic thought, which blossomed in the late 18th century, assumes that market partici-
pants are self-interested, rational, calculating agents. In The Wealth of Nations, n132 Adam Smith asserts that optimal 
utility is reached when humans are left to freely participate in market transactions. An individual will seek to maximize 
her utility by participating in trade that generates the most private benefit. Assuming the individual is rational and the 
individual will have access to perfect information, she will be capable of reaching terms of trade most advantageous to 
herself. Thus, each individual is personally responsible for the outcome of the trade-for better or for worse. According 
to Smith and his contemporaries, "Any failure to exercise his or her rights is the fault of  [*86]  either her reasoning 
or her will, n133 and not that of the market." n134 Adam Smith, Thomas Paine, n135 Voltaire, n136 and other humanists of the 
18th and 19th centuries helped to popularize these ideas which later became the standards for western market thought. 
These basic assumptions about the skills and responsibility of consumers form the foundation of thought in transna-
tional contract law as well. n137 Individual responsibility and rationality are necessary components of a properly func-
tioning free-market system that embraces laissez-faireism. However, where is the evidence that these assumptions are 
reasonable in a complex commercial environment that would require an appreciation for the wonders of modern engi-
neering and food chemistry to be able to sort through common product claims? 
The rules governing contract law in the 1800s seemed more than appealing to a group of hard-working individuals 
who valued individual responsibility and held romantic ideas about the capacities of the average person. Negligence on 
the part of the consumer was clearly a just standard for a society that touted the benefits of individual responsibility and 
proclaimed the beautiful conclusion when two intelligent, rational actors were left to negotiate the terms of a trade. 
The "rational agent" assumption has historically played a part in the formulation of two key arenas of American 
life-the market and the court. A free- market system assumes that a reified, rational agent exists while the  [*87]  ad-
versary system trusts in the rational juror. n138 Have we, as a society, placed too much faith in the hu-
man-as-rational-agent motif that has remained a founding principle of so many facets of American life? It certainly 
seems as if the branch of contract law that claims to protect consumers has posited a consumer who might or should be, 
rather than focusing on the empirical behavior of actual consumers. 
The rational consumer is the sanitizing agent of market theory, transforming the greed of firms into a force working 
on behalf of consumers. The economic principle of consumer sovereignty n139 offers a glimpse into the problems that 
may arise when we use the term "consumer" as an umbrella term to represent the general public. Ludwig von Mises 
conceived the concept of consumer sovereignty, which means that, in a free market, the consumers ultimately dictate 
what is to be produced. n140 While capitalists and entrepreneurs might steer the economy, they take orders from the con-
sumers by responding to demand for certain goods and lack of demand for others. n141 The producers of goods, who aim 
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to stay in business, must satisfy the preferences of consumers. n142 This narrative has both humanistic and ethical appeal 
because it promises to avoid the dangers of collective action. 
However, Mises, like many economists, fails to recognize that (1) all consumers are not equal in their capabilities 
to protect their interests, and (2) consumers and firms do not enter the bargain as equals. Furthermore, the consumer 
rationality assumption n143 that exists to bolster the  [*88]  effectiveness of the market system, as touted by classical 
economists, is questionable. Researchers have found that individuals often do not have the strength to exert self-control 
when making rational decisions. n144 As Russell B. Korobkin argued, consumers are boundedly rational rather than fully 
rational decision makers. n145 Because the opportunity costs of shopping for information about products differs among 
buyers n146 and consumers often fail to read or understand the terms in standard form contracts, the theoretical ability of 
markets to optimize consumer utility is not realized in the absence of remediation in the institutional arrangement of the 
market by the polity. n147 
  [*89]  
As advertising became pervasive in American business activity, consumers were besieged by product information, 
imagery, and puffing. Firms were not bound by any explicit contractual agreement to follow through with the state-
ments they made in an advertisement. If a buyer was deceived by an advertisement, the buyer was required to prove that 
the firm or seller knew the advertisements were untrue and that the intentions of the false statements were to urge the 
consumer to purchase the good. n148 One would be hard-pressed to locate any average consumer who could effectively 
take on such an immense task. 
VI. Conclusion 
Though advances in contract law protected consumers in many regards, corporations often had the upper hand 
when a consumer suffered a loss or injury. The burden to show that the product was carelessly made or that the product 
was marketed poorly fell on the consumer. n149 Furthermore, large firms had the financial capacities to deflect claims of 
faulty production. n150 Additionally, contributory negligence merely added to the burden of injured consumers. n151 
Increased advertising by firms, coupled with the development of the internet and, subsequently, e-commerce, insti-
gated a radical transformation in the context for transparency once again. Consumers are quick to click and consent to 
electronic standard form contracts on the web. n152 Though paper contracts and virtual contracts share certain attributes, 
n153
 the internet setting opens up a Pandora's box of opportunities for businesses to take advantage of unsuspecting con-
sumers. n154 Robert A. Hillman and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski extensively enumerate the implications of market failures in  
[*90]  relation to paper and virtual standard-form contracts. First, "reading and understanding boilerplate terms is dif-
ficult and time consuming for consumers." n155 Second, Hillman and Rachlinski argue that social forces acting upon in-
dividuals prevent those individuals from reading standard-form contracts. n156 Finally, the researchers list cognitive fac-
tors that prevent consumers from fully understanding the terms of a standard-form contract. n157 
Though a consumer might fail to understand a standard-form contract, a consumer may encounter even more trou-
ble when attempting to navigate the terms of an implicit contract. As we have seen, the context for the transparency of 
the terms of trade has changed over time. Advertising and e-commerce have created an environment in which consum-
ers are left to their own devices (or lack thereof) in determining the terms of a market transaction. Yet, consumers often 
remain unprotected from the business lie. 
Courts would seem to have a responsibility to reflect about the probable attributes of this elusive "consumer" that 
we hear about in marketing textbooks, the arguments of economists, and business journals. We can maintain a legal 
doctrine about puffing that is largely prescriptive in the sense that it assumes consumers are or should be the skilled 
agents of classical liberal thought. Alternatively, we can apply the same understanding of dishonesty to commercial 
enterprises that we apply in our relationships with families and friends. 
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